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Academic freedom has long been seen as a concept taken for granted as essential to a 
university as educational institution, and yet one that is notoriously difficult to pin down, 
especially in terms of the law. Britain’s 1988 Education Reform Act, for example, established 
the legal right of academics “to question and test received wisdom and to put forward new 
ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy of 
losing their jobs or the privileges they may have” (legislation.gov.uk). This articulation 
continues a tradition of academic freedom that has largely referred, since medieval times, to 
the freedom of the professor to research and devise curricula without coercive pressure from 
outside of the institution, and often – though not always, as in the British case – to the 
freedom of the student to learn (Altbach, 2007; Tierney, 2004). Wider definitions have 
included rights to choose what is taught irrespective of departmental requirements, rights to 
contribute to public discussion, and the right to criticise the university administration 
(Barendt, 2010). The majority of these definitions can be neatly categorised under one of 
Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty: a freedom to (research, teach), or freedom from 
(coercion). Either way, within the discourse of substantive liberties, or rights, the entitlement 
of individuals to concrete freedoms prevails over any reciprocal ethical obligation on their 
part.  
 
This paper accepts that the protection of a right under Berlin’s conceptualisation may be 
necessary as a form of legitimacy for certain practices within the university that uphold its 
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critical function in society, but questions whether the protection of academic freedom as a 
right sufficiently encompasses its educational remit in an age of international higher 
education. It explores the idea that academic freedom is never fully articulated as a right, 
without an accompanying notion of responsibility also. This is because the principles (moral 
and legal) underpinning academic freedom as a right can never directly coincide with, or 
fully do justice to, the conditions in which it is exercised. The paper therefore begins with a 
genealogical mapping of the historical development of academic freedom, to reveal its 
contested nature, nation-building interests, and ethical implications, and to demonstrate that 
the accepted status of academic freedom as a right today could not have come about without 
it already having been acted upon previously as a responsibility (to truth, disinterestedness, 
knowledge, society). The argument then turns to the question of whether academic freedom 
may need to also uphold an idea of responsibility if it is to do justice to something beyond the 
interests of the self or state (i.e. to knowledge, society, other people). Finally, I will show that 
academic freedom as a right and academic freedom as a responsibility are not two sides to the 
same coin, but are representative of competing ethical discourses that cannot be reconciled on 
the same terms.  
 
Is academic freedom safeguarding against its own? 
In countries with established traditions of conceptualising academic freedom as a right that 
pertains to individuals working in academia – usually the right to teach, research and publish 
free from external influence and coercion – the concept is commonly one that preserves and 
sustains reputation, credibility and employability within and between institutions (Haskell, 
1997; Menand, 1998). In many countries, however, particularly those often described as 
‘developing’, issues of censorship, religious orthodoxy, civil conflict and political oppression 
can all prove obstacles to a higher education institution’s ability to sustain an environment of 
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intellectual and professional stability that is understood to be a precondition of establishing 
academic freedom as a right. Indeed, it can be hard to see their quality of teaching and 
research as not being compromised by those very conditions.  
 
Higher education institutions in poorer countries, or those in zones of conflict and oppression, 
are thus often doubly deprived of that particular freedom considered fundamental to the idea 
of the university, in that they are seen as lacking first of all in the academic freedom 
bestowed on them by the authorities (the law, the government), and therefore also don’t have 
the ensuing legitimacy from their peers attached to their work that comes with that 
recognition. When Menand (1998) suggests that freedoms are essentially a question of 
creating “spaces in which parties engaged in specific pursuits enjoy protection from parties 
who would otherwise naturally seek to interfere in those pursuits” (p.3),1 he presents a moral 
discourse that is not only suspicious of external influence from the state or private companies, 
but perhaps also of other institutions that either can’t or don’t enjoy that same protection – 
and thereby risk delegitimising the sacred practices
2
 of disinterested research and critical 
questioning that academic freedom protects.  
 
Is it possible, then, that academic freedom as a principle or standard, might actually 
discriminate against its own, especially in a highly competitive international higher education 
environment? I think it is important to consider this possibility by departing not from the 
assumption that academic freedom can be guaranteed as a right as long as we can 
ontologically determine to whom it applies and under what conditions, but rather by 
considering the ways in which it has developed as a concept irrespective of any guarantee (as 
                                                          
1
 It is interesting to note here that Menand places academic freedom “at the heart of the political economic 
battles over the future of the university” (p.4), rather than at the heart of its moral purpose.  
2
 John Dewey, in The Public and its Problems, refers to the “religious aureole” that surrounds institutions 
whose sanctity seems to somehow transcend critical discussion. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics and Education on 
17/05/16, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2016.1181844 
 
it must necessarily do in countries in which academics do not enjoy any legislative 
protection), i.e. as both a risk and a responsibility towards intellectual freedom, rather than a 
form of protection. 
 
 
Hybrid origins of academic freedom 
Tracing the origins of the concept of academic freedom is by no means as simple as looking 
at its formal integration into university policy and protection. Cobban’s Medieval Universities 
(1975), for example, cites a number of ways in which academic freedom existed, alongside 
university autonomy, almost as an informal precondition from the birth of the European 
university. These included special privileges to determine the curriculum, and the ius ubique 
docendi, a recognised right of the holder of a degree from a studium generale to teach at any 
other university without further examination. These informal conditions served to protect the 
idea of free intellectual association from the ecclesiastical and secular authorities that granted 
them legitimacy – despite having to be awarded by the papacy. What these antecedent 
influences on academic freedom demonstrate, however, is that there were individuals within 
medieval universities who envisioned their purpose as more than self-preservation, but that in 
order to fulfil that purpose
3
, passports had to be provided. Impetus, however, can only have 
preceded implementation. It is the ethical foundations for this impetus that I will explore as 
responsibility later.   
 
The idea of a freedom pertaining particularly to the academy or academia finds roots 
in a Reformation/Enlightenment split between France and England on the one hand, and 
Prussia on the other. The first universities in Prussia to attempt the departure from the 
                                                          
3
 Cobban alludes ambitiously to the possibility of the ius ubique docendi to create “ a Europe-wide 
commonwealth which transcended race and provincialism in the collective pursuit and dissemination of 
learning” (1975, p.28) 
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residual scholasticism of their counterparts, and the Protestant coercion that came with 
Lutheran reform, were those of Halle (1694) and Göttingen (1743). Göttingen, for example, 
forbade the denunciation of teachers on the grounds of heresy. The University’s founder, 
Gerlach Adolf von Münchausen, also insisted on a lay appointing committee for professors. 
Given the risk of defying the stranglehold of Lutheran and Calvinist orthodoxy over 
university education at the time, von Münchausen was acting upon a sense of duty that 
exceeded the appeasement of ecclesiastical authority. A responsibility towards overcoming 
religious division that was intruding on free thought also, resulted in a right that meant that 
“Göttingen’s freedom to think, write and publish was unsurpassed in Germany” (McLelland, 
1980, p.39), and set a precedent for the concepts of Lernfreiheit (freedom to teach) and 
Lehrfreiheit (freedom to study or to learn) later developed by Wilhelm von Humboldt. 
Pertaining to academic and student alike, these became the principles of freedom in the unity 
of research and instruction characteristic of German university education from the eighteenth 
century. 
 
The United States: AAUP and tenure 
In 1915, the American Association of University Professors made its first Declaration on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure, which attempted to secure greater legal protection for 
academics in the face of possible dismissal and censorship, by tying its rights for protection 
not to the institution, but to the constitution instead. This significantly more public and 
political development in academic freedom was a self-conscious fusion of three different 
foundations to US notions of academic freedom: a philosophy of intellectual freedom, as 
originating in ancient Greece; the idea of autonomy for communities of scholars, arising from 
the European universities; and the “freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the federal 
constitution as elaborated by the courts” (Fuchs, 1963, p.431).  
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The first Declaration on Academic Freedom and Tenure was intended to protect 
academics as much in their socially-oriented role as public intellectuals as in their socially-
removed status as educators (Altbach, 2007). The influence of John Dewey is of significant 
interest in this respect, as he was both a member of the committee that set up the AAUP and 
an advocate of the idea that educators had to understand their freedom as a public 
commitment. As Dewey put it in The Public & Its Problems: “…the belief that thought and 
its communication are now free…is absurd…Removal of limitations is but a negative 
condition; positive freedom is not a state but an act” (1927, p.168). Dewey’s articulation here 
goes partway towards arguing against the libertarian view that the provision or establishment 
of negative liberties constitutes freedom for whom they are provided (he describes this as an 
“infantile state of social knowledge” in which a person cannot become emancipated simply 
by being left alone). He is one of the first to observe that demands for liberties or freedom 





However, whilst he is critical of those that want always to point the finger of blame at 
outside forces that prevent their free activity, Dewey stops short of arguing that acts of 
intellectual freedom must necessarily be acting upon a notion of responsibility. On Dewey’s 
view, the removal of limitations to a freedom in research and teaching holds no reciprocal 
obligation to act upon the freedom made available by that removal, because otherwise 
coercive influence might once again intrude upon academic disinterestedness.. In this regard, 
Dewey relies less on a notion of responsibility, than he does on moral integrity, articulated as 
“honesty, impartiality and generous breadth of intent in search and communication” (1927, 
                                                          
4
 For a more recent critique of this condition, consult Jon Elster (2015) ‘Obscurantism and Academic Freedom’, 
in Bilgrami and Cole (eds.) Who’s Afraid of Academic Freedom, Chichester: Columbia University Press 
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p.175). As such, any moral dimension of academic freedom falls back onto the character of 
the academic, rather than being imperative in the concept itself. Dewey’s argument for 
academic integrity is important for the American notion of the public intellectual: if research 
is in the public interest, then the freedom of the academic therefore has to extend to the public 
sphere, where his or her freedom of expression remains a protected right (different to the 
more generalised freedom of expression governed by the First Amendment). Haskell (1991) 
has proposed that this right is due to a fundamental need for trust in authority (albeit not blind 
trust), because “we are better off for our willingness to defer to experts” (p.56). The defence 
of the American formulation of academic freedom, then, might be that it is the limited right 
of the few to be trusted, for the greater public good.  
 
Despite his best efforts, Dewey’s contributions to the 1915 AAUP Declaration on 
Academic Freedom and Tenure may have unwittingly contributed to precisely the 
complacency and lack of action that his later text, The Public and its Problems, diagnoses, 
not least because of the explicit connection between academic freedom and tenure track. The 
idea behind the declaration may have been to secure a greater transparency of the connection 
of universities to the wider public, and the value of trusting in tenured academics as public 
intellectuals. But the question arises of whether the expansion of academic freedom into state 
legislation constitutes a greater degree of freedom, or whether it just expands the possibilities 
for abstention from social obligation, given that it is bound up with procedure, promotion and 
status? The introduction of a juridico-political clause in the theoretical nature of academic 
freedom, inscribed in the notion of tenure as a guarantee “which governs the fundamental 
employment relationship between the institution and the dominant segment of the academic 
work force” (Chait and Ford, 1982, p.58), sees the simultaneous inscription of the right into 
the wider economy: a substantive freedom as a precious commodity that links academic 
activity to earnings in the workplace.  
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In other words, the hitching of academic freedom onto career progression puts into 
motion a potentially damaging cycle as regards the practice of academic freedom as social 
commitment. Junior academics, for example, might be more likely to be compliant in their 
research orientation and activities at the early stages of their career so as to secure the 
foundations of tenure track later on (without this calling into question their academic 
integrity). What’s more, the attempted alignment of legal, economic and moral considerations 
all occur within a framework designed to contribute towards nation-building; academic 
freedom as tenure may contribute to greater stability, public understanding and sense of duty 
within the nation state, but does not necessarily extend beyond its own borders. 
 
The paradox of a national tradition of academic freedom 
Should academics be bowing to the pressures of producing work that facilitates tenure 
(i.e. that which provides concrete evidence of its social impact), then the standardisation of 
performance measures threaten to transform academic freedom into exactly what Dewey 
feared: a “state” rather than an “act”. Academic freedom becomes a form of protecting 
already established entities (freedom of speech, one’s job, the self), rather than the necessary 
risk of exploring new terrain. In this case, academic freedom as a right becomes particularly 
problematic, as it too conforms to this ontological foundationalism: a right hinges on 
established moral or juridical traditions. So whilst most articulations of academic freedom 
defend it on the grounds that it ensures the potential for progress and thinking anew both 
among staff and students, the conceptual deference to moral and legal foundations for its 
legitimacy means that academic freedom reproduces an internalised paradox: I am free to 
adhere to a particular or established notion of freedom.  
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This is not to undermine the need to offer guarantees that the work of academics and 
students will be afforded some protection in order to give space to experiment (with ideas, 
knowledge, voice, self). Rather, the notion that any freedom is, as Menand says, artificial, is a 
reminder not to be complacent about the fact that, as a right alone, academic freedom can just 
as easily secure an individual’s or institution’s capacity to remain the same (albeit through 
performative practices of critical thinking, or saying what others are afraid to), and even to 
permit poor scholarship. An awareness of this situation need not demand of academic 
freedom an inscription into its articulation that it be equally accountable as it is entitled. 
Indeed, the discourse of accountability is counter-productive here, as it suggests an economy 
of expectation whereby certain behaviours can be guaranteed in return for certain 
professional protections. Where accountability can only be assumed after an event, I want to 
suggest that there is an ethic of responsibility peculiar to the university that exists both prior 
to, and after, the event of its enactment – both compelling action, and recognising that one’s 
obligations are not over once an action is complete. This is the case because the conditions in 
which it occurs are never again the same. 
 
 
The risk of academic freedom 
Academic freedom is, for the most part, nowadays treated as a substantive right that 
pertains to individuals within higher education institutions, whose legitimacy frequently rests 
on identification of outside forces that threaten its practice. This conception sits comfortably 
within a broader rights-based moral tradition that places a greater emphasis on individual 
freedom(s) than a concern for the freedom of others. The rights discourse itself, irrespective 
of its political affiliations, is a universalist approach to legislating morality that inevitably 
falls back on individual entitlement. Hillel Steiner, for example, articulated his left-libertarian 
thoughts of ‘compossible rights’ in terms of “a range of actions that its possessor may 
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perform” (Steiner, 1977, p.267). The language of possession is significant here. Rights that 
are supposedly for all would only need to be put in place if some people were in possession 
of them and others were not. As a consequence, we are all individually capable of assessing 
where we stand in relation to this rights economy. This doesn’t, of course, prevent people 
from championing the rights of the dispossessed, but the positive identification of lack that 
this altruism requires still serves to reinforce an economy of entitlement, rather than an 
ethical (relational) counter to the moral economy that cannot be reduced to its substantive 
parts. 
 
Those who have made the case for rights, whether with regard to academic freedom 
or more broadly, have also tried to ensure that a notion of responsibility is also inscribed 
therein. Steiner, for example, argues that any right implies a concomitant duty on the part of 
other people not to interfere or prevent the actions of the possessor of rights. The AAUP 1915 
Declaration states that “there are no rights without corresponding duties”, and that the 
freedoms which the academic should expect to enjoy “entail certain correlative obligations”. 
In both instances, responsibility is seen to be equivalent to the right. But if academic freedom 
is to be acted upon in ways that are often problematic because they anticipate future 
beneficial outcomes that cannot be contemplated with current frames of legal or moral 
reasoning, then its ethical imperative must be seen as alternative, rather than equivalent, to its 
entitlement.  
 
Emmanuel Levinas locates the origin of a rights tradition based on equivalent 
entitlement in Kant’s notion of practical reason, in that the ‘normative energy’ of rights 
extends from the idea that, as long as they can be shown to be free from logical or rational 
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contradiction, then they can be understood as universal. Levinas exposes the inherent paradox 
of rights based on practical reasoning by means of a question: 
 
“…could it be that the decision of a free will conforms to a maxim of action which 
can be universalized without being contradicted and that, thus revealing the reason 
that inheres in a free will, this makes itself respected by all other wills, which are free 
because of their rationality?” 
(Levinas, 1998, p.134) 
 
What Levinas highlights here is the mutually reinforcing foundations of reason and free will: 
if freedom is premised upon reason, only those considered reasonable can be considered free. 
By default, those considered reasonable are also best positioned to define what it means to be 
both reasonable and free. Freedom as a (moral) right, then, necessitates the mutual agreement 
on everyone’s part that the language of rights is one that is representative of their voice (as an 
individual, community, culture, nation). This notion is contested by Levinas, who argues that 
the assertion of a right always entails an act of violence, because it is the assertion of one 
will, masquerading as representative of a universal will, over another. In other words, rights 
derived from practical reason, may just as easily be employed to enact injustice, or not to act 
at all, as to counter it.
5
 This means that a substantive freedom can never be seen as a right that 
is fully established, or not itself contestable in some way, if it is not to be used to commit 
violence or defer responsibility. Rights, because they are based on a process of reason that 
takes into account what is already known about where they have been lacking in the past, are 
necessarily backwards-looking, ensuring that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated. 
The other half of the story to academic freedom, though, is the story that is not yet told about 
                                                          
5
 (Kant himself used his own appointment as Professor at Königsberg to employ other faculty who supported 
his approach to philosophy (Kuehn, 2001). 
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the future of knowledge and the people that (will) engage with it in the university. The other, 
unknown, face to academic freedom is that of an ethical responsibility – a responsibility for 
the best education in an unknowable future.  
 
The risks that some people take in the name of academic freedom to advance certain 
causes cannot be reduced to simply observing a right; in many cases, academics and students 
have flouted their rights as institutionally defined to act in the interests of others – whether 
the academic community, wider society, or on a global scale. These risks often pre-date their 
subsequent protection in terms of rights, and therefore refute the claim that an ethics of 
academic freedom can be reduced to its enshrinement as a normative entitlement. Tierney and 
Lechuga (2005) have pursued this notion by suggesting that the non-dispute of academic 
freedom within an institution is not itself a sign that all is well in terms of expressive liberties. 
Indeed, they suggest that cultures of silence more commonly indicate a repression of 
academic freedom rather than evidence of its existence, because a “culture of silence can be 
created that is pervasive to such an extent that individuals do not even consider speaking out” 
(p.11). The authors make the point that, just because there were no official cases of lesbian 
and gay academics being denied the right to investigate ‘queer’ issues in 1950s America, that 
doesn’t mean that rights weren’t being institutionally infringed upon through enforced 
silence. To say that academic freedom was not denied black members of university faculty in 
apartheid South Africa would be an equally specious argument, given their lack of 
representation within the academy (Sehoole, 2005). Rule (2006) has also described the 
“historically white” institutions of pre-1980s South Africa as “monologic” precisely because 
they did not “recognise the otherness of the students and [imposed] unfamiliar and 
administrative and academic discourses upon them” (p.84). These examples seriously call 
into question the illusionary Western idea that “universities are social institutions that are 
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communicatively open,” in which “any one of its members can contest any claim by any 
other one of its members” (Barnett, 2003, p.223). 
 
Cultures of enforced silence are often only exposed retrospectively, and are addressed 
by integrating corrective measures – such as rights – into existing regulations and legislation. 
But examples such as that of South Africa, or the USA under McCarthy, show that 
compensatory measures do not recognise the degree to which the voice of an Other cannot 
simply be assimilated into a more accommodating version of a universal rule, because there 
is an asymmetry of worldviews in such a situation that the rule cannot wholly account for. 
Even appropriate academic conduct cannot necessarily be relied upon here, as the 
suppression of voice and identity is hard to justify, even when one’s integrity in relation to 
one’s own discipline remains intact. To explain why this is the case, and why an asymmetry 
of worldviews necessitates an understanding of academic freedom as a responsibility as much 
as a right, I will draw upon the example used by Bill Readings in an essay on Lyotard and the 
concept of the différend. 
 
Readings, Lyotard, and academic freedom’s différend 
During the McCarthy period in the United States, early AAUP member Albert Einstein 
advised a number of colleagues against invoking the Fifth Amendment (the right to a fair 
trial before a grand jury) when called to appear before the hearings of the 1950s. He did so 
because he believed that the appeal to a fair trial might actually play into the hands of the 
McCarthyists, by sidestepping the problems posed by the First Amendment, i.e. the issues of 
freedom of speech. A ‘fair’ trial could easily be afforded to the accused by playing out the 
processes that were to all intents and purposes legal, but were, in Einstein’s view, designed to 
extort particular versions of the truth so as to incriminate others. What it does not do is invite 
witnesses to give their own opinions, perspectives, or voice on the validity of a politics that 
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might condemn them outright (thereby suggesting that it was the McCarthy committee that 
was in fact in violation of the First Amendment).  
In the case of Einstein’s advocacy against his colleagues’ invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment, the academic recognises a right, but not the judicial terms within which it is 
currently framed. Whereas the academics whose political affiliations where under scrutiny 
were looking at appealing to the Fifth Amendment as an appeal to the mutual logic of 
practical reason that bridges and transcends the law and academia, Einstein’s view was that 
the invocation of a right to a fair trial would grant too much legitimacy to the grounds for 
accusation. What’s more, in recognising that one can be tried for a heresy that one does not 
consider to be such, there is a danger that the individual not only indicts herself, but also 
affirms the logic used to do so. Einstein argued against the appeal to the Fifth Amendment 
because it would allow the McCarthy committee to dodge the problem posed by the First 
Amendment, advocating a Ghandi-inspired position of ‘non-cooperation’ to show that 
academics would not dignify the accusations against them with the recognition of legitimacy 
that a free trial would ensure. He was able to do so by showing that the McCarthy process 
could only achieve its desired outcomes if it honoured one aspect of the constitution, but not 
if it came into conflict with another.  
 
This situation of conflict, to which, as Einstein observed, silence was the only proper 
response, is described by Jean-François Lyotard, as a differend, or the point “at which the 
framework of political representation…performs a victimisation” (2002, p.170). But this is 
not just victimisation at the level of fear as attached to identity. Lyotard is keen to show that 
this victimisation is insuperable because the Other cannot be contained or subsumed within 
the same sphere of reasoning as that of the accuser. Lyotard cites the example used by 
historian Robert Faurisson of eyewitnesses being asked whether gas chambers were used for 
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the mass extermination of Jews during World War II. The line of questioning means that “the 
only acceptable proof that it was used to kill is that one died from it” (2002, p.3), else the 
witnesses are automatically discredited by virtue of their being still alive. The result is that 
the voice of the witness is silenced, either by the trauma of the event for which they have now 
words anyway, or by the process which seeks to discredit their experience through logic – if a 
person claims to be a victim of the gas chamber, the claim is invalidated by virtue of that 
person still being alive. Faurisson’s point might be that victims can only seek justice if they 
can prove themselves to be victims, but their proof has to be provided in accordance with 
what is commonly recognised as reasonable, or reasoned, evidence. However, as both 
Einstein and Lyotard have shown, even the willingness to try and provide that evidence may 
undermine one’s own case. 
To make a similar point about the “negative phrase” of silence, Bill Readings draws 
on the fictional example of Werner Herzog’s film Where the Green Ants Dream, in which an 
Aboriginal group wants to prevent an Australian mining company from conducting blasting 
tests lest they disturb the dreaming of the green ants on the land. The Aborigines are unable 
to fight their case in court, not only because of the spiritual framing of their discourse, but 
because they are unable to elect a single voice to speak on their behalf (the idea is anathema 
to people that make decisions as a group, rather than deferring to a representative), and 
because they do not conceive of time, space, property and geography in anything like the 
same way as those who would seek to pay them off. 
 
In both these examples, the idea is to show that the différend is neither something that 
can be overcome, but nor should it be ignored. It is not about recognising another’s right to 
think differently, which would constitute an attempt to bring the other into a shared 
(totalised) understanding of reason, identity and rights. Nor does it mean annexing the other 
as an inaccessible and non-cooperative identity. In these instances, justice is reduced to “the 
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exclusive rule of representation” (Readings, p.173), of which rights are the best exemplar. In 
the case of Herzog’s film, this means that each individual that forms part of the Aboriginal 
community at issue has their identity entirely reduced to that of their ethnicity. This idea of 
the différend, then, is particularly significant in the discourses of colonialism and 
development, because both have involved the assertion of a particular idea of the good 
(and/or human) over others in the name of a higher good. 
 
What the différend highlights is the inability of rights as an enshrined form of justice 
pertaining to the individual to coincide with, and thus account for, heterogeneity, multiplicity, 
difference and otherness in an age of globalisation. This inadequacy does not lie only with 
those who fail to recognise the rights of others because their own rights are more important. It 
also extends, as Readings describes as being at play in Herzog’s film in the form of a judge 
sympathetic to the Aboriginal cause, to those who seek to be fair by deferring to an abstract 
notion of humanity. Readings goes so far as to say that, in the film, the Aborigines are 
effectively “killed with kindness, by the assumption that they are the same kind of people as 
the white Australians” and that they are “silenced by the very fact of being let speak” (p.180). 
The latter description cogently summarises my own critique of the idea of academic freedom 
as a right, or capability. To believe that granting anyone a positive, substantive freedom 
guards against the possibility of that freedom being the very thing that makes them unfree, is 
a dangerous one. It makes of academic freedom a purely rhetorical concept, and one which is 
therefore assimilable to ideological and performative forces, rather than constituting a 
resistance towards such assimilation. Academic freedom, if it is to justify itself as something 
that members of higher education institutions need in order to conduct their activities, has to 
show that a freedom from constraint is not simply a freedom to be frivolous 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics and Education on 
17/05/16, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449642.2016.1181844 
 
Rather than be despondent, however, both Lyotard and Readings suggest that there is 
an affirmative dimension to be found in the différend, which is that of a responsibility to 
attest to it, to bear witness to it. This responsibility can be seen in the example of Einstein. 
Einstein’s argument was that it was the process of questioning itself that violated the 
amendment, and therefore any appeal under its interrogation was already compromised. By 
voicing his objection, Einstein bore witness to an incommensurability between the law and 
academic freedom as he saw it. Lyotard was keen to point out that a silent objection did not 
constitute an abstaining from responsibility: “That the opposite of speaking is possible does 
not entail the necessity of keeping quiet. To be able not to speak is not the same as not to be 
able to speak” (p.10). In advocating not speaking, Einstein can be seen as having stepped 
outside of the limitations of academic freedom as a right (which could not protect him), to act 
upon it solely as a responsibility.  
 
Academic freedom as a responsible act need not be limited to these larger gestures: in 
day-to-day practice, the act of teaching or doing research can similarly be seen as being 
conducted in a spirit of experiment or risk that goes beyond a compliance with formal 
regulation or a deliberate antagonism, to act in the best interests of others, the future of 
others, and other futures. What this means is that academic freedom is not simply a political 
issue, or an ethical one, but both, and more. It defines the way that all members of the 




My argument in this paper has been to state that considering academic freedom simply as a 
right does not tell the full story of what the concept entails, and indeed might limit the very 
idea of freedom that it implies. The negative approach to freedom suffices if one agrees with 
Ménand (1996) that freedoms “are socially engineered spaces in which parties engaged in 
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specified pursuits enjoy protection from parties who would otherwise naturally seek to 
interfere in those pursuits” (p.3). Expressed in substantive terms, freedoms are as much a 
source of suspicion as those sources they seek protection from.  
 
To try and concretise academic freedom as a right, then, based solely upon these 
generalisations, is to institute at every stage yet more possibilities for unfreedom, 
hierarchisation, and even an enduring colonialism. As long as academic freedom remains an 
identifiable and quantifiable notion, it passes into a system of self-interest and self-protection 
(Barnett, 1988), and an economy of those that have it as opposed to those that don’t (through 
no fault of their own). This sets the stage for a global higher education which recycles 
inequality whilst championing access, mobility and excellence for all.  
 
Academic freedom as a right only tells half the story of academic freedom because it 
is retrospective, and is based upon what is already known about the history of the university, 
and past injustices upon which it can act. The other half cannot be told because it looks ahead 
to the university’s role in an unknown future. There are two ways to engage with the 
unknowable half, of academic freedom: either by allowing the right to dictate the outcomes 
of that future, or to acknowledge that every right is in itself a recognition of the failings of 
previous rights to create the best future outcomes. If the latter position is accepted, then an 
ethical position towards the future is required that does not assume the best outcomes in 
advance, and instead remains open to its possibilities, especially to the idea that those 
possibilities might arrive from elsewhere, i.e. from a place which retrospective knowledge 
has not equipped us to expect, comprehend, or rationalise. 
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